Does Value Pluralism Prevent Consensus on Justice?
Martijn Boot
Does value pluralism prevent consensus on justice?This paper discusses the consequences of value pluralism for the possibility of achieving consensus on justice. Justice is a multifaceted concept. Its multiple aspects are related to plural values, which may conflict mutually. Besides, elements of justice may clash with other weighty human values. If these conflicts occur, many philosophers believe that we should weigh the relevant demands of justice against each of them or against other important human values. However, under particular conditions, incommensurability of the relevant plural values prevents the assignment or determination of objective and impartial weights. In those cases, an impartial or objective ranking, or the right balance, do not exist. People may recognize the same universally valid human values, principles of justice and human rights. Achieving consensus on all important questions of justice is nevertheless unlikely, due to the problem that there seems to be no right or single right and determinate balance and ranking of these plural and universally valid but sometimes conflicting values and ethical demands.
